Bealer has a number of reasons for thinking that a naturalistic epistemology is self-undermining. Let me focus on one of these. (I've tried to take on all of them in the first chapter of Knowledge and Its Place in Nature.)
Talk of belief in these animals is not some kind of anthropomorphism. We simply cannot explain the kinds of problem solving and behavioral sophistica… - Hilary Kornblith
Talk of belief in these animals is not some kind of anthropomorphism. We simply cannot explain the kinds of problem solving and behavioral sophistica…
- Hilary Kornblith
Here, there is simply no substitute for the kind of work that experimental psychologists do, work which shows some mechanisms to be quite reliable, a… - Hilary Kornblith
Here, there is simply no substitute for the kind of work that experimental psychologists do, work which shows some mechanisms to be quite reliable, a…
The idea that we should check on our unreflective belief acquisition sounds great, but we need to know whether the processes of reflection which we p… - Hilary Kornblith
The idea that we should check on our unreflective belief acquisition sounds great, but we need to know whether the processes of reflection which we p…
What I hankered for was an account of knowledge which would do far more than get our intuitions about cases right; I wanted a kind of account which w… - Hilary Kornblith
What I hankered for was an account of knowledge which would do far more than get our intuitions about cases right; I wanted a kind of account which w…
The fact that we have been able to develop a successful science, which issues in ever more accurate predictions and broader explanations, is the real… - Hilary Kornblith
The fact that we have been able to develop a successful science, which issues in ever more accurate predictions and broader explanations, is the real…
For one thing, I think that there are questions which philosophers raise which, although science bears on them, are not typically the central focus o… - Hilary Kornblith
For one thing, I think that there are questions which philosophers raise which, although science bears on them, are not typically the central focus o…
I believe, that empirically informed approaches to the question have issued in more illuminating answers than the old armchair approaches. But I thin… - Hilary Kornblith
I believe, that empirically informed approaches to the question have issued in more illuminating answers than the old armchair approaches. But I thin…
I do agree with Stich that a quick move from our evolutionary origins to the reliability of our cognitive mechanisms is not legitimate. As I see it, … - Hilary Kornblith
I do agree with Stich that a quick move from our evolutionary origins to the reliability of our cognitive mechanisms is not legitimate. As I see it, …
If one's interest is not in some global question about the possibility of knowledge, but about some particular mechanism or inferential tendency, thi… - Hilary Kornblith
If one's interest is not in some global question about the possibility of knowledge, but about some particular mechanism or inferential tendency, thi…
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