A century ago mainstream science was still quite happy to countenance vital and mental powers which had a 'downwards' causal influence on the physical realm in a straightforwardly interactionist way. It was only in the middle of the last century that science finally concluded that there are no such non-physical forces. At which point a whole pile of smart philosophers (Feigl, Smart, Putnam, Davidson, Lewis) quickly pointed out that mental, biological and social phenomena must themselves be physical, in order to produce the physical effects that they do.
Natural selection has ensured that each species achieves the requisite effect somehow, but it doesn't care, so to speak, how the trick is done. - David Papineau
Natural selection has ensured that each species achieves the requisite effect somehow, but it doesn't care, so to speak, how the trick is done.
- David Papineau
In truth a clear-headed physicalist shouldn't be thinking any of these dualist thoughts. If pains are one and the same as C-fibres firing, then there… - David Papineau
In truth a clear-headed physicalist shouldn't be thinking any of these dualist thoughts. If pains are one and the same as C-fibres firing, then there…
I say that there is nothing deficient about our current theoretical grasp of mind-brain identities. The problem is only that they are counter-intuiti… - David Papineau
I say that there is nothing deficient about our current theoretical grasp of mind-brain identities. The problem is only that they are counter-intuiti…
A century ago mainstream science was still quite happy to countenance vital and mental powers which had a 'downwards' causal influence on the physica… - David Papineau
A century ago mainstream science was still quite happy to countenance vital and mental powers which had a 'downwards' causal influence on the physica…
On the methodological issue, I think that would be hopeless to try to adjudicate between my view and orthodoxy by appeal to phenomenological introspe… - David Papineau
On the methodological issue, I think that would be hopeless to try to adjudicate between my view and orthodoxy by appeal to phenomenological introspe…
The 'phenomenal concept' issue is rather different, I think. Here the question is whether there are concepts of experiences that are made available t… - David Papineau
The 'phenomenal concept' issue is rather different, I think. Here the question is whether there are concepts of experiences that are made available t…
I think that there are non-physical laws all right: genuine (if not strict) laws written in the language of biology, economics, and so on. But I don'… - David Papineau
I think that there are non-physical laws all right: genuine (if not strict) laws written in the language of biology, economics, and so on. But I don'…
After all, in supporting phenomenal concepts I am in a sense siding with introspection against the more behaviourist Wittgensteinians. But even so I … - David Papineau
After all, in supporting phenomenal concepts I am in a sense siding with introspection against the more behaviourist Wittgensteinians. But even so I …
I'm not so sure that I am a reductionist in the strict type-identity sense. The issues here are messy. But I certainly a reductionist in the more gen… - David Papineau
I'm not so sure that I am a reductionist in the strict type-identity sense. The issues here are messy. But I certainly a reductionist in the more gen…
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